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Classical security design papers equate competitive capital markets to securities
being fairly priced in expectation. We revisit Nachman and Noe (1994)’s adverse
selection setting, modeling capital-market competition as free entry of investors,
and allowing firms to propose prices of securities, as happens in private securities
placements and bank lending. We show that separating equilibria exist in which
high types issue under-priced debt, while low types issue more informationally-
sensitive securities (e.g., equity). We also uncover pooling equilibria in which firms
issue under-priced debt. These results provide foundations for the pecking-order
theory of external finance, and positive profits for uninformed lenders.
Keywords: Adverse selection, strictly positive profits, security design
∗We thank Ron Kaniel, Ilan Kremer, Tingjun Liu, Christian Opp, Dmitry Orlov, Uday Rajan and
Pavel Zryumov for useful comments.
1 Introduction
Which securities should be issued to finance investments by firms with information that
investors lack? And will these securities be fairly priced? Seminal papers by Myers (1984)
and Myers and Majluf (1984) posed these questions, developing a ‘pecking-order theory’
according to which debt is preferred to equity as it minimizes the under-pricing of the
securities issued by the best firms. Nachman and Noe (1994) (henceforth, NN) provides
foundations for this theory, showing that within the class of monotonic securities that
satisfy limited liability and zero investor profits, issuing risky debt is uniquely optimal.
This result has two caveats. First, NN predict that all firms would pool on the same
debt contract. Thus, as Leary and Roberts (2010) observe, ‘strictly speaking, the peck-
ing order does not allow for any savings behavior or equity issuances’. Therefore, NN
cannot be used to micro-found empirical tests based on firms’ heterogenous financing
choices.1 Second, the assumption that this pooling debt contract must be fairly priced
in expectation conflicts with the evidence that many securities issued by firms appear to
be under-priced.2
This papers relaxes the assumption that investor profits must be zero, and shows how
adverse selection generates both a pecking-order theory, and under-pricing of securities
despite free and costless entry of investors. Specifically, we prove that separating equi-
libria exist in NN’s environment in which the best types issue under-priced debt, while
the worst types issue an alternative, fairly-priced security (e.g., equity) that is more
informationally-sensitive than debt (DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005)). In a sepa-
rating equilibrium, competitive investors make strictly positive profits on the debt issued
by best types. This is because this debt is priced so that investors would make zero
profits if it were issued by the worst type. We then prove that pooling equilibria exist in
1Common tests ask whether ‘better firms’ rely relatively more on debt (e.g., Frank and Goyal (2003),
Fama and French (2005)). These tests are inconsistent with NN’s pooling equilibrium. As Leary and
Roberts (2010) note, they test a ‘modified pecking-order theory’ that lacks solid foundations.
2See, for example, the literature on the credit spreads puzzle (Bai, Goldstein and Yang (2020)) and
on the cost of bank loans (Chodorow-Reich, Darmouni, Luck and Plosser (2020)).
1
which firms pool on under-priced debt, i.e., debt priced below its expected pooling value.
We obtain two testable predictions. First, worse firms issue less debt, which holds
strictly in any separating equilibrium, and trivially under pooling. Second, better firms
issue under-priced debt, which is a generic feature of equilibrium—i.e., it holds at every
separating equilibrium and every pooling equilibrium except NN’s. The contrast with
NN’s result reflects the fact that, when non-negative investor profits are allowed, it is no
longer without loss to constrain firms to only issue unpriced securities, as NN implicitly
do, committing to selling the securities at some auction price. Indeed, firms routinely of-
fer priced securities, for example negotiating loans with banks at proposed interest rates,
or seeking to privately place a certain number of shares with an investor.
To understand what sustains a separating equilibrium with positive profits despite free
entry of investors, one needs to start from the three properties that must hold in any
‘reasonable’ separating equilibrium of classic security design settings, such as NN. First,
low-type firms are indifferent between mimicking or not the equilibrium security choice of
high types—i.e., their incentive constraint binds. Second, securities issued by low types
are fairly priced. Third, zero-profit curves across types do not intersect. Together these
properties imply that investors must make profits on high-type firms in any separating
equilibrium. Equilibria in which investors expect zero profits must be pooling (Innes
(1993), Nachman and Noe (1994), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)).
Unlike these papers, we do not impose zero investor profits. To see why ‘reasonable’
equilibria with strictly positive investor profits exist, consider a separating equilibrium
in which high-type firms issue a priced debt security—e.g., a bank loan—that just covers
external financing needs, and low types issue equity that also just meets their financing
needs. The properties above imply that investors must break even on the debt were it
issued by low-type firms. Thus, any deviation that could benefit high-type firms would
also appeal to low-type firms. This includes offering off-equilibrium an unpriced debt
contract, such as a public bond, as in NN. Therefore, even the strong D1 refinement
of Cho and Kreps (1987) has no bite, and pessimistic off-equilibrium beliefs sustain a
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‘reasonable’ separating equilibrium with positive profits.
Turning to pooling equilibria, we first confirm that an equilibrium exists in which all
firms pool on issuing an unpriced debt contract, as in NN, and investors break even. Then,
we complete this characterization by showing that this is the sole equilibrium allocation
that features zero investor profits, while a continuum of equilibria exists in which firms
pool on issuing under-priced debt. The most severe under-pricing corresponds to the case
in which debt is priced so that investor profits would be zero if the debt was issued by
low-type firms, as under separation. Thus, all firms are worse off under separation than
pooling, even though equilibrium contracts are optimal and renegotiation-proof.
Comparing pooling and separating equilibria reveals a fundamental contrast between
our framework and costly signaling models. Consider, for instance, the literature on
under-pricing in IPOs (e.g., Welch (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) or Allen and
Faulhaber (1989)). In these settings, high types credibly signal their identity by leaving
money on the table in the IPO market, in order to enjoy reduced financing costs in future
SEOs (Seasoned Equity Offerings). Thus, accounting for SEOs, high types always benefit
from separating. In contrast, high types in our model never benefit from separation,
because they issue under-priced debt once, and there are no subsequent financing rounds.
To our knowledge, it is a novel feature of our model that competitive investors can make
positive profits despite the ‘single crossing’ of indifference (iso-profit) curves. To see why,
it helps to contrast our model and the security design problem under adverse selection
studied in Brennan and Kraus (1987), in which firms start with existing assets and exoge-
nous amounts of outstanding debt and equity. Because firms can issue ‘negative equity’
(by repurchasing existing shares), in that setting there exists a feasible mix of securities
that firms can issue at which a specific iso-profit curve—the zero-profit curve—intersects
across types. It follows that investors must make zero profits in equilibrium. In contrast,
in classic security-design models, such as NN, firms have no securities to repurchase, so
zero-profit curves never intersect at some feasible securities bundle. As a result, separating
3
equilibria exist in which uninformed investors make positive profits on high-type firms.3
To underscore that positive-profit equilibria arise naturally in financing problems un-
der adverse selection, we note that they also emerge in models where some firm types
have negative net present value projects (e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Ti-
role (2010), chapter 6)). In such settings, previous work that restricted attention to zero
investor profits predicted a market breakdown instead. However, Bernhardt, Koufopou-
los and Trigilia (2020) show that a market breakdown can be a unique equilibrium only
if investors are exogenously constrained to make zero profits. Otherwise, a separating
equilibrium always exists in which investors make profits on high-type firms. Moreover, if
firms have access to any collateral at all, then the separating equilibrium becomes unique.
Our extension of NN is empirically relevant. NN’s mechanism in which firms choose
securities and then investors bid in auctions can describe public bond issuance by large
corporations, or even IPOs and SEOs. However, it does not capture private securities
placements to investors, or bank lending and syndication, where firms seek to raise a fixed
amount with a loan at a given interest rate. Private financing instruments represent a
common funding channel for small and medium enterprises that invest under severe in-
formational asymmetries. In contrast, public issuances typically come from larger, estab-
lished corporations—entities where informational asymmetries are far lower.4 Our gener-
alization of NN’s security design problem extends it to many new economic environments.
2 Example
To clarify economic intuition, consider a simple example. A firm needs $1 to finance a
project. A high-type firm’s project yields $6 with probability 1
2
, and zero otherwise. A
3Of note, these separating equilibria are robust to ambiguity aversion over the population share of each
firm type, or their cash flow distributions. This reflects that each security offered is priced so that investor
profits would be zero if issued by low types. This result is relevant for the growing literature on security
design under ambiguity aversion (Carroll (2015), Lee and Rajan (2018) and Malenko and Tsoy (2020)).
4Our setting is particularly relevant for bank lending, where a large literature relates bank profits
with an informational advantage of banks (e.g., Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)). In our model, such
profits may obtain even though banks lack informational advantages over the market on their borrowers.
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low-type firm’s project yields $4 with probability 1
3
, and zero otherwise. Each type is
equally likely. There is free entry of risk-neutral investors and the risk-free rate is zero.
Suppose firms can only issue debt, equity, or a combination.5 Debt offers bondholders a
payment of min{x,D} for x ∈ {0, 4, 6}, where D is the face value of debt. Equity, which is
junior to debt, gives shareholders a dividend of max{α(x−D), 0}, where α ∈ [0, 1] is the
share sold. Thus, a mix of debt and equity is worth 1
2
[max{α(6−D), 0}] + 1
2
[min{6, D}]
if issued by high types; 1
3
[max{α(4 −D), 0}] + 1
3
[min{4, D}] if issued by low types; and
it is worth the average of these two expressions if firms pool on the same mix.









Figure 1 plots the four relevant iso-profit curves in (α,D) space. ZPH is the zero-profit
line for high types, described by 1
2
[max{α(6 − D), 0}] + 1
2
[min{6, D}] = 1; ZPL is the
zero-profit line for low types, described by 1
3
[max{α(4−D), 0}] + 1
3
[min{4, D}] = 1; and




















Finally, IPH,L is the iso-profit curve for high types that offer only debt (α = 0) on
ZPL, and so is parallel to ZPH . To derive IPH,L, solve ZPL for D when α = 0 to ob-
tain D = 3. Next, compute the value of (α,D) = (0, 3) if issued by high types by
5In this example, one can trivially separate the types by exploiting the non-overlapping support.
Our main model assumes a common support and shows that the economics is unaffected.
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substituting into the left-hand side of ZPH , to get
3
2
. Thus, IPH,L is characterized by
1
2
[max{α(6−D), 0}] + 1
2
[min{6, D}] = 3
2
.
NN show that if investors must make zero profits, then both types pool on issuing
debt, fairly priced for the average type. To see this, start from any mix of debt and
equity (α,D). First, because ZPH < ZP0 < ZPL, investors cannot make zero profits
on all firms in a separating equilibrium.6 Therefore, the equilibrium contract must be
on the zero-profit pooling line, ZP0. Second, if firms pool on anything other than debt,
then, because ZPH is steeper than ZPL, high types could deviate to issuing debt that is
slightly under-priced from the average firm type’s perspective. The deviation would be
unprofitable for bad types, but strictly profitable for high types if accepted by investors,
violating D1. Therefore, issuing equity cannot be part of a ‘reasonable’ equilibrium.
Turning to our positive-profits equilibria, suppose high types offer only debt on ZPL,
while low types offer only equity on ZPL. Then, debt is under-priced because it is issued
by high types, but equity is fairly priced. The high type’s iso-profit line to which this
contract belongs is IPH,L, which lies strictly below ZPL whenever α > 0. Therefore,
deviating to any contract that could benefit high types, also benefits low types. Thus,
common refinements including D1 have no bite: with sufficiently pessimistic beliefs, this
deviation would be unprofitable, sustaining the positive-profits equilibrium. Indeed, sep-
arating equilibria exist in which low types issue any mix of debt and equity such that
α > 0 on ZPL, while high types only issue debt on ZPL. Moreover, pooling equilibria in
which all firms issue under-priced debt exist: all debt contracts along the y-axis in Figure
1, between ZP0 and ZPL—as highlighted by the solid segment—are equilibrium securities.
The example illustrates clear testable empirical implications, despite equilibrium multi-
plicity: (i) high types issue relatively more debt than low types; and (ii) high types’ equilib-
rium securities are under-priced. We now show that these results extend to richer settings.
6Abusing notation, we write ZPH < ZP0 to indicate that the cost of financing under full-information
for high types is strictly below that for the fifty-fifty pool. Thus, the iso-profit curve for high types has
a strictly lower α for any given D than the pooling iso-profit curve.
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3 Model
Our two date model features two types of risk-neutral firms that must obtain external
credit to finance a project. Firms can raise funds from a continuum of competitive, risk-
neutral investors.7 We normalize the risk-free rate to zero. Projects require investment
of $1 at date t = 0 to generate random cash flows x̃ at t = 1. A firm’s type θ ∈ {θH , θL}
corresponds to its expected cash flows, where θH > θL > 1.
8 Thus, both firm types have
strictly positive NPV projects, so it is efficient to fund them. A fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of
firms are high types with θ = θH . The mean firm type is θ0 := pθH + (1− p)θL.
We denote a realization of x̃ by x, and the probability density function over x for a
type-θ firm by fθ(x), which we assume is strictly positive on a common, finite support
[0, x̄]. The random cash flows associated with the two firm types are ordered by the strict




> 0 for every x ∈ [0, x̄].9 Thus,
the probability that a cash flow x comes from high types increases in x.
Contracts. As in NN, firms can sell securities s(x) : [0, x̄] → R that specifiy payouts
to investors as a function of the realized cash flows x. NN also require the price Q(s)
of any equilibrium security equal its expected value given investor beliefs about the firm
type offering it. In contrast, we enlarge the contract space to let firms propose selling
prices, as occurs in private security placements. Definition 1 formalizes this distinction.
Definition 1. Denote the contract offered by a type θ firm by cθ. A contract consists
of either a priced security, i.e. cθ = (sθ, Qθ(sθ)), which competitive investors can accept
or reject to buy,10 or an unpriced security, cθ = sθ, whose price Q(s) is determined by
Bertrand competition among the competitive investors.
7If instead of a continuum of investors we had any number N ≥ 2, our results would hold a fortiori,
as positive-profits equilibria are easier to sustain with Betrand competition than free entry.
8NN do not assume that a type coincides with expected cash flows, but this economizes on notation
and the models are isomorphic.
9Technically, NN impose Conditional Stochastic Dominance (CSD), a weaker condition than MLRP.
The subsequent literature mostly works with MLRP (e.g., DeMarzo et al. (2005)), as it is more tractable
and does not alter economic intuition.
10With multiple bidders, a lottery allocates the security to one bidder.
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Most private securities placements involve priced securities, as firms often seek to raise
a fixed amount that equals their external financing needs for a budgeted project. A bank
loan of $1 is a priced debt security where s = min{x,D} for some D ∈ [0, x̄] and Q(s) =
$1. A private equity issuance for $1 of capital is a priced equity security where s = αx for
some α ∈ [0, 1] and Q(s) = $1. The expected value of such securities for investors need
not be $1. In contrast, a public bond issuance is an unpriced security s = min{x,D} for
some D ∈ [0, x̄], where the amount raised Q(s) is the outcome of an auction.
Definition 1 clarifies the difference between our environment and NN’s. NN restrict
attention to unpriced securities, while we allow firms to issue both priced and unpriced
securities, at their discretion. As is standard in the literature, we assume that a feasible
security s satisfies two-sided limited liability and monotonicity:11
Definition 2. A contract c is feasible if it offers investors a feasible security s. A security
s is feasible if it satisfies:
(LL) Limited Liability: s(x) ∈ [0, x] for every x.
(M) Monotonicity: for every (x, x′ < x) ∈ [0, x̄]2, s(x) ≥ s(x′) and x−s(x) ≥ x′−s(x′).
Limited Liability (LL) implies that securities regulate how to split cash flows between
firms (which receive x − sθ(x)) and investors (who receive sθ(x)). Monotonicity (M)
implies that feasible securities are continuous functions of realized cash flows x.
Signaling game. At stage 1, a type-θ firm offers a feasible contract cθ ∈ {(sθ, Qθ(sθ)), sθ},
which consists of either a priced security (sθ, Qθ(sθ)), or an unpriced security sθ. After
a contract c is issued, investors form beliefs p′(c) := Pr.[θ = H|c] about the type offering
it. At stage 2, given these beliefs, investors bid for the contract. For priced securities,
bids consist of acceptance/rejection decisions. If Q ≥ 1 is accepted, then (observable,
verifiable) investment occurs. Otherwise, the firm consumes its endowment, which we
11Limited liability guarantees that an equilibrium exists, and is needed to derive most results in the
security design literature. Monotonicity ensures that the optimal security for θH types is debt, but is
not needed for existence of separating equilibria. We maintain this assumption to simplify exposition
and comparisons with NN.
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normalize to zero. If Q > 1, we follow NN and assume that the difference Q− 1 is paid
to the firm’s shareholders as a dividend at t = 0.
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) that satisfy the D1 refinement. The
expected payoff to a type θ firm that offers security s and invests is given by




Q(s) is the price paid by investors for security s; $1 is the required investment; θ is the
full-information expected value of a type-θ project; and
∫ x̄
0
sθ(x)dFθ(x) is the security’s
full-information expected value. We focus on ‘reasonable’ Perfect Bayesian equilibria,
i.e., PBE that satisfy the D1 refinement (Cho and Kreps (1987)):
Definition 3. A ‘reasonable’ PBE is a pair of feasible contracts (c∗L, c
∗
H), and investor
beliefs p′(c) for every feasible contract c that satisfy:
SR Sequential rationality: firms propose contracts c∗H and c
∗
L optimally, given investor
beliefs p′(c) and the associated optimal bidding decision;
BC Belief consistency: p′(c∗H) and p
′(c∗L) are derived from Bayes’ Rule.
D1 Refinement: there does not exist a pair of types θ, θ′ and a feasible c 6= c∗θ such that:
{p′|Uθ′(c|p′) ≥ Uθ′(c∗θ′)} ⊂ {p′|Uθ(c|p′) > Uθ(c∗θ)}.12
The D1 refinement is standard in this literature. It rules out equilibria sustained by
off-equilibrium beliefs that assign positive probability to types that weakly benefit from
the deviation ‘in strictly less cases’ than other types, in a set-inclusion sense. In such
cases, D1 forces off-equilibrium beliefs to assign probability one to the firm type that
benefits ‘in strictly more cases’ than any other type.
12We use the standard definition of the D1 refinement (Cho and Kreps (1987)), which ranks sets of
off-equilibrium posteriors. NN’s alternative definition ranks off-equilibrium prices. The definitions are





We first analyze separating equilibria. It is well known that separating equilibria cannot
exist if investors must make zero profits on every security offered in equilibrium. Lemma
1 summarizes this.
Lemma 1. There is no separating PBE in which all securities issued are fairly priced:
there is no equilibrium with sH 6= sL and Eθ[sθ(x)] = Q(sθ), ∀θ.
Proof. If Eθ[sθ(x)] = Q(sθ), ∀θ, then Uθ = θ−1 for every θ in equilibrium. The incentive
constraint for low-type firms not to mimic high-types reads: θL − 1 ≥ Q(sH)− 1 + θL −
EL[sH(x)] ⇐⇒ EL[sH ] ≥ Q(sH). Because EH [sH ] = Q(sH), incentive compatibility
requires EH [sH ] ≤ EL[sH ] ⇐⇒
∫ x̄
0




(FL−FH)dx ≤ 0. Monotonicity of security payments in cash flows (Condition M),
yields dsH ≥ 0 and since sH is a continuous function, it is differentiable almost every-
where. By continuity and because investment is risky, we have dsH > 0 for a positive
measure of cash flows. Strict MLRP implies that FH(x) < FL(x), for every x ∈ [0, x̄).
Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint cannot hold.
Lemma 1 has two implications. First, separating equilibria in which firms issue un-
priced securities cannot exist. This corresponds to NN’s Proposition 1. For our analysis,
it follows that we can restrict attention to separating equilibria in which at least one type
issues a priced security. Second, Lemma 1 implies that a separating equilibrium must
feature strictly positive profits for competitive investors on at least one firm type.
We now highlight properties of separating equilibria with positive investor profits. First,
in any ‘reasonable’ separating equilibrium, low-type firms must be indifferent between of-
fering their equilibrium contract cL and mimicking high-type firms by offering cH 6= cL.
If not, high-type firms would have deviations that would not attract low types, but make
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high types better off, violating D1. Thus,
Lemma 2. A separating PBE satisfies D1 only if the incentive constraint for low-type
firms binds: UL(cL) = UL(cH).
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, that a separating equilibrium satisfying D1 exists at
which UL(cL) > UL(cH) ⇐⇒ EL[sH ] − Q(sH) > EL[sL] − Q(sL). Investors are indi-
vidually rational so EL[sL] − Q(sL) ≥ 0. Thus, EL[sH ] − Q(sH) > 0. By strict MLRP,
EL[s] < EH [s] for any strictly monotonic security s. Therefore, EH [sH ] − Q(sH) >
EL[sH ]−Q(sH) > 0: the participation constraint for investors upon observing the high-
type equilibrium security sH is slack.








cause EL[sH ]−Q(sH) > EL[sL]−Q(sL), and EL[sL]−Q(sL) ≥ 0.
Deviating to s′H would be unprofitable for low types, regardless of investor beliefs. To
see this, notice that at the lowest possible α, where α = Q(sH)−Q(sL)+EL[sL]EL[sH ] , incentive com-
patibility for low types requires EL[sL]−Q(sL) ≤ EL[s′H ]−Q(s′H) = EL[αsH ]−Q(sH) =
EL[sL] − Q(sL). In contrast, the deviation is profitable for high-type firms because (i)
it costs less, EH [s′H ] < EH [sH ]; and (ii) it would be accepted by investors. Thus, a
contradiction obtains.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is straightforward. However, it has the important impli-
cation that the incentive constraint for high-type firms never binds in separating equilib-
ria. To see this, start from a pair (sL, sH) with sH 6= sL such that EL[sL] = EL[sH ]. Con-
sider the effect of a change of measure on both sides of the equation, from FL to FH . When
the securities are not identical, the effect must be heterogeneous. Moreover, the incentive
constraint must hold. Therefore, high-type firms must issue less informationally-sensitive
securities (DeMarzo et al. (2005)) than low-type firms at a separating equilibrium.
Definition 4. A security s is more informationally sensitive than security s′ if its payoff
crosses that of s′ from below, in the space of cash-flow realizations [0, x̄]. Formally, if
11
Eµ[s] = Eµ[s′] then Eµ[∂s/∂x] > Eµ[∂s′/∂x], where µ denotes any probability distribution
over the set of types θ ∈ {θL, θH}.
Debt is the least informationally-sensitive monotone security: fixing a family of secu-
rities with the same expected value under some measure µ over types, the payoff of any
monotonic non-debt security must cross that of debt from below. We use this to conclude
that low-type firms must issue more informationally-sensitive securities in equilibrium.
Lemma 3. A separating PBE satisfies D1 only if the incentive constraint for high-type
firms is slack: UH(cH) > UH(cL). Therefore, the security issued by low-type firms, sL, is
more informationally sensitive than that issued by high-type firms, sH .
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, there exist sH , sL with sL 6= sH and UH(cH) = UH(cL).
Then UL(cH) = UL(cL) from Lemma 2. Combining these equations yields EL[sL] −
EH [sL] = EL[sH ] − EH [sH ], or, equivalently:
∫ x̄
0
(sL − sH)d(FL(x) − FH(x)) = 0. From
strict MLRP, this requires sL = sH , a contradiction. Lemma 2 then implies that
EH [sH ]−EL[sH ] < EH [sL]−EL[sL]. Lemma 2 implies that we need to consider the fam-
ily of securities with the same expected value under the measure that puts probability
one on low-type firms. Strict MRLP implies that, within this set of securities, high-type
firms strictly prefer the least informationally-sensitive one, so sH must be strictly less
informationally sensitive than sL.
Lemma 1 rules out separating equilibria with zero expected profits on all securities.
We next establish that in any separating equilibrium, competitive investors never make
strictly positive profits on low-type firms. Therefore, investors must make strictly positive
expected profits on high types in any separating equilibrium.
Lemma 4. A separating PBE satisfies D1 only if investors do not make positive profits
on low-type firms: EL[sL] = Q(sL).
Proof. Suppose a separating equilibrium exists with EL[sL] > Q(sL). From Lemma 3,
low-type firms can deviate to a security s′L = βsL for β ∈ (
Q(sL)−Q(sH)+EH [sH ]
EH [sL]
, 1) at which
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all incentive constraints hold: the security is constructed so that it is never a profitable
deviation for high types. The proof logic from Lemma 2 guarantees that s′L is feasible.
Moreover, for β ∈ ( Q(sL)EL[sL] , Q(sL)), which is a non-empty interval given EL[sL] > Q(sL),
the participation constraint for investors holds. Therefore, deviating to s′L is profitable
when θ = θL, but not when θ = θH , violating D1.
Our last preliminary lemma establishes that in any ‘reasonable’ separating equilibrium,
high-type firms must offer a priced security that exactly covers their financing needs.
Intuitively, all firms value cash in the same way, but high types expect to pay more to
lenders for any security, so reducing cash and security differentially appeals to high types.
Lemma 5. A separating PBE satisfies D1 only if high-type firms offer a priced security
that raises the exact amount needed by the project: Q(sH) = 1.
Proof. Suppose a ‘reasonable’ PBE exists with Q(sH) > 1. EL[sH ] − Q(sH) = EL[sL] −
Q(sL) = 0 from Lemmas 2 and 4; and EH [sH ] − Q(sH) < EH [sL] − Q(sL) from Lemma
3. Consider the deviation for high-type firms to another priced security (s′H , Q(s
′
H)) such
that Q(s′H) = Q(sH) − εs′H = αsH for some α ∈ (0, 1 − εEH [sH ]). The proof logic from
Lemma 2 guarantees that s′H is feasible. If accepted, s
′
H makes high types strictly better
off relative to sH . Further, low types do not mimic since EL[s′H ] − Q(s′H) > 0 ⇐⇒






ε < 0 ⇐⇒







the highest possible value for α inside the first expression. EL[sH ] < EH [sH ] by strict
MLRP, so the deviation is profitable, violating D1.
Proposition 1 builds on these lemmas to establish that separating equilibria exist, and
that they share the same qualitative structure. Specifically, in every separating equilib-
rium, high types always issue debt; while low types issue more informationally-sensitive
securities such as equity or a non-degenerate mix of debt and equity.
Proposition 1. There exists a continuum of separating equilibria that satisfy D1. Every
separating equilibrium features the following common properties:
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1. High-type firms issue a standard debt security: sH = min{x,DH};
2. The security sH is under-priced: the face value DH sets EL[min{x,DH}] = 1;
3. Investors make strictly positive profits on high-type firms: EH [min{x,DH}] > 1.
4. Low-type firms issue any security different from debt (i.e.,sL 6= min{x,D} for any
D ∈ [0, x̄]), such that EL[sL] = Q(sL) ≥ 1.
Proof. Lemma 3 ensures that low types do not issue debt. First suppose that property
(1) fails, and both firm types issue non-debt securities: sθ 6= min{x,Dθ} for Dθ ∈ [0, x̄],
for each θ. Consider the deviation by high-type firms to a debt security s′H = min{x,DH}
for some DH ∈ [0, x̄], where DH is such that EL[min{x,DH}] = 1+ε, for ε > 0, small. By
Lemma 2, this deviation is unprofitable for low-type firms, because low types are indif-
ferent between mimicking or not when ε = 0. High-type firms compare EH [min{x,DH}]
with the expected payout at the posited equilibrium EH [sH ]. Strict MLRP implies that if
D is the face value of debt such that EL[min{x,D}] = 1, then EH [min{x,D}] < EH [sH ],
where the inequality follows because the payoff of any feasible (monotonic) non-debt se-
curity crosses that of debt from below. Thus, one can increase slightly the face value of
debt from D to DH so that EH [min{x,DH}] < EH [sH ], and EL[min{x,DH}] = 1 + ε.
Now, let high-type firms issue debt: sH = min{x,DH} for theDH such that EL[min{x,DH}] =
1. The only deviation that could lower the payout for high types is to a security s′ such
that EL[s′] < 1. However, this would be profitable for low types whenever it is profitable
for high types (i.e., when the investors’ off-equilibrium belief is such that the offer is
accepted). Thus, D1 has no bite in this case.
Property (4) follows immediately from the previous analysis, because if low-type firms
issue debt, then high-type firms cannot find a security design that separates them without
attracting low types. Thus, if sL is debt, there must be pooling. Property (2) follows
from Lemmas 2 and 4, which imply that EL[min{x,DH}] = EL[sL] = 1. Property (3)
follows from the strict MLRP assumption.
Proposition 1 is novel in the context of the security design literature, providing insights
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into both the theoretical and empirical literature on capital structure and security design.
Theoretically, our results show that separating equilibria exist in which investors make
strictly positive profits on high-type firms. These separating equilibria are often ruled
out by imposing zero-profits constraints on investors in equilibrium (see, e.g., NN’s ‘com-
petitive rationality’ condition for equilibrium). With this added constraint, consistent
with our characterization, the unique equilibrium that satisfies D1 has all firms pooling
on the same debt contract, which is fairly priced for the average firm type.
Empirically, our results provide foundations to tests of the ‘pecking-order’ hypothesis.
Such tests typically ask whether in some sample, the set of ‘better firms’ (high types)
relies more on debt than the set of ‘worse firms’ (low types). But as we just argued, secu-
rity design under asymmetric information and zero profits necessarily delivers a pooling
equilibrium in which every firm relies on debt, contrary to the pecking-order premise. Our
paper shows that once one allows for positive investor profits—in a competitive economy
with free entry of investors—then a solid foundation for these tests of the pecking-order
obtains. That is, in our separating equilibria, high types issue only debt, while low-types
must issue other securities such as equity.
Our micro-foundations for empirical tests of whether high-type firms issue debt and
low-types a combination of debt and equity do not rely on the concept of a firm’s debt
capacity, which is not micro-founded in this adverse selection setting (Leary and Roberts
(2010)). Instead, in our model, low types have an intrinsic preference relative to high
types for more informationally-sensitive securities (e.g., equity rather than debt). That
is, in the context of our example, the iso-profit curve of low types is flatter (in equity-debt
space) than that of high types (see Figure 1).
4.2 Pooling equilibria
We conclude by characterizing all pooling equilibria, in which sL = sH ≡ sP , for some
feasible sP . Given a zero-profit restriction for investors, NN identify the unique pooling
equilibrium that satisfies D1. In this equilibrium all firm types pool on a debt contract
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that is fairly priced for the average firm type. We relax this restriction, letting investors
earn non-negative profits on the equilibrium security offered by the pool of firms.
Investors make non-negative profits in a pooling equilibrium if and only if Q(sP ) ≤
E0[sP ] := pEH [sp] + (1−p)EL[sp]. We first establish that in any pooling equilibrium with
non-negative profits, the security sP on which the two types pool must be debt.
Lemma 6. In any pooling PBE that satisfies the D1 refinement, all firm types issue debt:
sL = sH = min{x,DP} for some DP ∈ [0, x̄].
Proof. Suppose there is a pooling equilibrium where sP 6= min{x,DP} for some DP ∈
[0, x̄]. Consider the deviation to the debt security s′ = min{x,D′} with a face value D′
such that E0[min{x,D′}] = E0[sP ]. Evidently, s′ is less informationally sensitive than
sP . Thus, low-type firms are worse off at s
′ than sP , while high-type firms are better
off, conditional on the offer being accepted by investors. Thus, D1 implies that investors
hold the off-equilibrium belief p′(s′) = 1, making the deviation profitable.
We next establish that in any pooling equilibrium, all firms raise the minimum amount
needed for investing. NN (Theorem 8) proved that this holds in the unique ‘reasonable’
equilibrium in which firms issue unpriced debt. We extend this result to priced securities.
Lemma 7. In any pooling PBE that satisfies the D1 refinement, all firm types raise
exactly the capital required to invest in the project, that is: Q(sp) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that a ‘reasonable’ pooling equilibrium exists with Q(sp) 6= 1. We
only need to consider Q(sp) > 1 because Q(sp) < 1 would mean a firm cannot in-
vest, so no capital would be provided, as investors would expect to lose money. Let the
high type deviate to a security s′ such that Q(s′) = 1. Because of cross-subsidization,∫ x̄
0
sp(x)dFH(x) > Q(sp) >
∫ x̄
0
sp(x)dFL(x). Therefore, the deviation is only profitable
for high types, if accepted, while it is never profitable for low types.
The characterization of all pooling equilibria in Proposition 2 below follows directly
from Lemmas 6-7. One equilibrium is the zero-profit debt equilibrium identified by the
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literature. The other equilibria involve all firm types issuing under-priced debt, with a
degree of underpricing that spans from zero to the extreme in which debt is priced so
that it would make zero profits for investors if issued only by low-type firms.
Proposition 2. There exists a continuum of pooling equilibria that satisfy D1. In any
such equilibrium, all types raise exactly $1 of capital by issuing debt with a face value
DP ∈ [D0, DH ], where DH solves EL[min{x,DH}] = 1 and D0 solves E0[min{x,D0}] = 1.
Proof. Lemma 6 implies that we can restrict attention to debt contracts offered by all
types on-the-equilibrium path. Lemma 7 implies that we can restrict attention to con-
tracts that raise exactly $1. Any pooling debt contract with face value D > DH would
violate the incentive constraint for low types. Moreover, investors would reject any pool-
ing debt contract with face value D < D0, as they would expect to lose money. Consider
now a candidate equilibrium in which debt is issued with a face value DP ∈ [D0, DH ].
Then E0[min{x,DP}] ≥ 1, so investors would accept the contract. We must show that it
satisfies D1, regardless of the expected profits accruing to investors. To see this, observe
that, starting from a debt contract, for some security s′ to benefit high-type firms, it
must be that EL[s′] < EL[min{x,DP}]. Thus, whenever the off-equilibrium belief held by
investors leads to acceptance, both types benefit strictly. Therefore, D1 has no bite.
Importantly, high-type firms are strictly better off in all pooling equilibria that have
debt contracts with face value DP ∈ [D0, DH) than they are in all separating equilibria,
even though high types cross-subsidize low types in pooling equilibria. This reflects the
fact that the debt security issued by high types in separating equilibria would break-even
for investors if issued solely by low types. This is the opposite of outcomes in settings




Economic theorists typically equate unfettered competition with zero profits. Our paper
reconsiders the classical security design problem of a firm that seeks finance from com-
petitive investors for a project whose quality is private information of the firm. Nachman
and Noe (1994) show that if one imposes that the investors earn zero profits, then all firm
types necessarily pool on offering a debt contract that is fairly priced in expectation.
We highlight that, from a theoretical standpoint, NN restrict the contract space, not
allowing firms to offer investors priced securities. In practice, priced securities are often of-
fered in private placements or bank lending, where an issuer shops around, proposing and
negotiating prices with different potential investors, and then selecting the best deal. We
let firms issue priced or unpriced securities to competitive investors who provide capital if
they can earn non-negative profits in expectation. We show that restrictions to zero prof-
its are not driven by some un-modeled Bertrand competition, but rather by the exclusion
of securities with proposed prices—and that this restriction has bite. We identify ‘reason-
able’ separating equilibria in which low types issue fairly-priced securities that are more
informationally-sensitive than debt, while high types issue debt that is fairly-priced for
low types, and hence under-priced for high types. We also identify a range of pooling equi-
libria in which all types issue debt that is under-priced relative to the average firm type.
Our model provides theoretical foundations for empirical tests of the pecking-order
theory of external finance. These tests cannot be reconciled by existing pecking-order
theories, which predict that all firms pool on debt, and that equity is never issued. Our
model also provides foundations for the profitability of bank loans, syndicated loans and
privately-placed debt, in a setting where lenders do not have any informational advantage
or moral hazard problem to justify their rents. Banks make strictly positive profits even
though they are competitive and lack ‘soft’ information about firms.
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